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ABSTRACT

A study examined the treatment of Chinese affairs in four American newspapers during December 1949, when China fell to Communism. Content analyses were conducted on issues of the "New York Times," "The Christian Science Monitor," "The Chicago Tribune," and "The St. Louis Post-Dispatch." Each of the 416 articles examined was classified as relating to either Nationalist China (Taiwan) or Communist China. Results indicated that among the selected newspapers, "The Christian Science Monitor" was the only one that paid more attention to the Communists than the Nationalists, while the other three contributed the majority of space to the Nationalist government and followers during the last month of 1949. The results suggest that American newspapers tended to pay a little more attention to Nationalist China than to its reival in the Chinese Civil War. However, on the average, articles on Chinese Communists appeared more lengthy and thorough than those on the Nationalists. Analytical reporting appeared in nearly one-quarter of the Communist articles. (A historical essay on 20th-century China as well as extensive tables of data from the study and a four-page bibliography are included.) (HTH)

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A CONTENT STUDY OF SELECTED AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS ON THE FALL OF CHINA IN 1949

A PLAN B PAPER

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE SCHOOL

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

By

EDWARD YI CHAO

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For the Degree of
Master of Arts

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Dr. Edwin Emery

April, 1977

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I. INTRODUCTION: AN HISTORICAL ESSAY

A. China After 1911

China, a land mass of four million square miles facing the western pacific and alternating between fertile land, high mountains and great rivers, has been the historic home of the Chinese people. On both banks of the Yellow River are vast stretches of fertile plain, once the cradle of Chinese civilization. During the Neolithic period dating back five or six thousand years, there already was progress in life and culture.

The Chinese people are a mixed product of a number of races. From several different cultures as time went on, they have developed similar customs, habits, ideas, beliefs, and language. With a population of nearly 800 million today, China ranks the first among the nations of the world. In ancient days, the Chinese believed that they, "living in the center of the world", were the only people existing on the earth. That's how the term 中國 (China) comes. 中 (reads as chung) means "middle" or "center", and 國 (reads as kuo) is "kingdom" or "country" in Chinese. This geographical ignorance might be one of the reasons why and

how China has been so isolated from the west that even Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolution of 1911 could hardly open her door to the outside world. However, a locked door has not guaranteed peace in the house. Wars have been constant in China since she was founded in 2698 B.C. by Huang Ti (The Yellow Emperor), the first ruler of China recognized in the recorded Chinese history.

The revolution in 1911, and the establishment of the republic which followed it, was a milestone from where, China has been able to absorb western values of democracy, freedom, equality as well as modernity and mechanism into the traditional format of spirit and civilization of her own. The true leader of the revolution was Dr. Sun Yat-sen who, as an exile since 1896, had been a prophet, spokesman and organizer of revolution among communities of Chinese settlers and students overseas. It was Dr. Sun's ideal of reform, republic and democracy which gave the ultimate meaning to revolutionary movements and a rallying cause against the Ching Dynasty--the last one in Chinese history.

Although Dr. Sun's constitutional ideas were in most ways excellent, it was clear to any realist inside China that his proposed power transition from the imperial to military leader, to eventually a majority of civilians, would need to cope with the selfishness of men in power, whether

imperialist or revolutionary. Thus, the first decade of the Republic of China turned out to be a chaotic period with local warlords fighting over each other.

Only one year after Dr. Sun died in Peiping, Chaing Kai-Shek, young commandant of the Army military academy, came into power. He was appointed the commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army, taking command of the Northern Expedition, a Nationalist military campaign against the stubborn warlords in the north.

The internal battle lasted for almost two years and ended just three years before the Japanese aggressors launched their first attack on a Chinese city in late 1931. They forced their way into the city of Mukden and occupied it in the evening of Sept. 18, 1931, recognized as "918 incident" in Chinese history books.

In between the clear exposure of Japan's ambition over the materially-enriched Manchuria and the first shot fired by a Chinese soldier against the "Eastern Devils", China under the directives of Chiang Kai-shek, was preparing herself for the inevitable combat with Japan by tolerating the ruthless violence and endless demands of the Japanese troops in north China and vowing for negotiation through international organizations. As the mediating efforts proved to be in vain, war came with a rush after the clash

at Peiping's Marco Polo Bridge on July 7, 1937. This was the unveiling of the so-called Resistance War Against Japanese Aggression which, to most of the Chinese meant a long period of cold, dark and bitter days. It took tremendous sacrifices and the blood of 3.2 millions of Chinese soldiers and countless civilians that were killed or wounded, to finally achieve the victory. It would take historians a great deal of time in evaluating China's contributions to the winning of World War II. Undoubtedly there will be those who will heavily discount China's contributions, and some may even argue that China was a military liability. Yet, in spite of the fact that China lacked able administrators to operate her army and economy with better efficiency, and in spite of the fact that many individuals and families profiteered in goods and made fortunes in the controlling of money and transportation, the Chinese people and the overwhelming majority of officials made great sacrifices which contributed materially to the final success of the war.

Following the sacrifices of the Sino-Japanese war, another misfortune befell China, as a result of post-war social instability and economic collapse.

The nation was divided. The split came between the Nationalists and Communists in an all-out struggle for power.

It was known as "Chinese Civil War" which, during its four-year sway, destroyed the post-war rehabilitation and eventually worsened the interior chaos, repelled the Nationalist government and kept hundreds of millions of Chinese from freedom, democracy and well-being, the most valuable elements of human life well-appreciated in Dr. Sun's three principles of people.

B. Nationalists v. Communists: Elements and Policies

The Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) included a wide range of opinion, all deeply affected by the fact that they are Chinese. The extreme right within the Kuomintang was primarily neo-Confucianist in thinking and opposed to Communism as much because it was an alien philosophy as because the Communists proposed to overturn the political scale of power. The conservative attitude of this group was chiefly due to a deep loyalty to the traditional ideology and social organization that once served China well.

Among other segments in the Kuomintang were a few local warlords who joined the party as a result of their failure to stand alone independently against the wave of patriotism that swept China ever since the break-up of Sino-Japanese War. Some of them were making improvements in their domains when war came; some were switching themselves from military lords to political figures; some were still a

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little better than bandits.

Among the center groups were bankers, businessmen and trained technologists. Many of them received advanced education in America or Europe, and were well-versed in the western theory of democratic institutions. Many were good administrators in governmental and private operations trying to establish an equilibrium between government-owned heavy industry and privately-owned light industry.

In the left wing of Kuomintang were men who supported a more complete socialism, state ownership and operation of industry, and who also had supported a policy of closer relations with the Soviets.

The Communists were also composed of three major groups. There was a powerful leadership of Marxism. Most of the political leaders who strongly supported the more power-mad elements of contemporary Moscow fell into this category. While this leadership was aware that all policies must be adapted to the Chinese scene, it followed the Moscow line very closely, particularly in all international affairs.

The second group in the Communist Party were those agrarian reformers who were, to some extent, using communism as a tool to fulfill their desire for fundamental readjustments in the social and economic relationship of the countryside. This group had been less doctrinaire and more compatible

with the center and left wings of the Kuomintang than the thoroughly Marxist leadership segment of the Communist Party.

A third group of people under the Communist banner were individuals who disagreed with some of the Kuomintang government policies and were branded as anti-Kuomintang or Communist. They eventually attached themselves to the Communist movement for lack of a better vehicle for their convictions.

Communism in China, since being forced from the cities after its split from the Kuomintang in 1927, had been essentially a political movement designed to gain power through stressing and manipulating the poverty and conflicts that existed in the rural community. Communist leadership takes pride in having adopted Marxism to the agrarian situation in China, and is responsible for the creation of the over-simplified concept that China is a two-class society in which the landlords oppose the peasants. The chief instrument by which the Communists strived to grasp power was the class conflict engendered by means of such a two-class concept. They had become extremely facile in manipulating tensions until the poorer segment of the community was goaded into action which permitted Communists to gain power.

C. 1949: The Turning Point

Many China observers have found that there had been an underground, slow-paced but effectively-developed interior war within the period of Chinese resistance against the Japanese. The Communists under the title of "loyalty to the central government and resistance against Japanese" in their propaganda, were recruiting soldiers and developing armed forces in the preparation of the next stage show: grab control of this nation. As the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge had been staged by the Japanese to provide an excuse for the invasion of north China, Chiang Kai-shek decided at once to make use of all Chinese forces including the Communist troops in Shensi Province in order to drive Japanese invaders out of his country. Thus, in their first battle of the war, the Chinese Communists had gained an important victory, and they made much of this fact in their propaganda throughout the country. They did not mention however, that they had not pursued the Japanese to take military advantage of their victory. Nor did they tell of their intention not to fight another major battle against the Japanese. But the fact was that in the following eight years of war, no Chinese Communist force as large as a division, or as numerous as 10,000 men, was to participate in another

pitched battle against the Japanese. After having achieved the propaganda advantage of one major victory, Mao Tse-tung wanted no more risks of meeting the Japanese and weakening his armies. Although the Communists did not take military advantage of their victory against the Japanese, they did take actions to gain a political advantage over the provincial governments and National Central Government of China. As their attention and efforts were directed mostly to expanding the area of their political influence, and to strengthening their military forces in Shensi and east central China, they, within a few years, had already made more than five provinces as their base areas for the opening of their all-out military insurrection which, led to the complete take-over of China mainland a few years later.

When the year of 1949 approached to its end, the long-time dream of the Nationalist leaders to reunite China faded away as they once again removed their capital, this time to Taiwan. As a result, nearly 500 million Chinese remaining on the mainland have been ever since kept from the outside world by the iron curtain. Again, the door of China was tightly shut.

For years, the assessment of China before and after the Communist takeover remained controversial. 1949 served as the turning point to the unprecedently drastic change of

the world political and military situation, strategic significance of Asian-Pacific nations, and above all, the entire lifestyle of Chinese peoples. To the Chinese Reds, and those who had their life improved after the turnover of China, the Chinese Civil War or the "liberation of China" was highly praiseworthy. Whereas for other mainlanders who have been suffering from the totalitarian regime of the Communists and those thousands of refugees every year who fought their way out in search of freedom by swimming or running across the China border, the incident of 1949 will always remain as a nightmare in their memories.

In Taiwan, the Nationalists, who took refuge in this island redoubt 28 years ago as the home base for rehabilitation, are enjoying a materially and politically satisfactory life as the Reformed Kuomintang Government has achieved a strong "economy of miracle" which based mainly on foreign trade. The current situation in Taiwan appears to be stable, peaceful and prosperous despite its diplomatic frustration caused by the switch of most of its allies to the Red China's side as a result of the threat of the latter's military readiness and nuclear power. This is a high standard of living that for centuries Chinese people have not even dreamed of. But, asked if they feel that they are fortunate and

benefited from the war, few of the 17 million Chinese would give a positive answer. Because they could not but miss their relatives and friends on the mainland and still anxiously want to step back on to the homeland where they, their parents or their ascendants were born and brought up.

D. China and the World Press

At the time of 1940's, "communism" was still largely unacceptable to most of the people in the world. As the Chinese Civil War just exploded, most of Western observers expected the end of the war in the near future with victory won by the Nationalists, or a merge of Communist Party into the dominant Nationalist government, especially when the Western impression on the performance of the Chinese Nationalist army against the Japanese aggression during the Sino-Japanese War remained vividly excellent. In the later stage of the war, however, the Communists had gained more sympathy and attention from the domestic and foreign public through their efforts in propaganda.

Early 1940 was the date that marked not only the beginning of difficulties between the two parties in China, but also the beginning of damaging images of the Nationalist government in the foreign press. It appeared to be true that some of the accusations pinned upon the Nationalist govern-

ment by foreign correspondents, who had listened to bitter criticisms of the Communists and their sympathizers, had strong basis in fact, and at times played a part in accelerating reforms. But, it was also true that the foreign newsmen sometimes merely were used by the Communists as disseminators to spread unfavorable rumors against the Chinese Central Government.

Hollington Tong stated in his book

> The Communists were most skillful in their handling of propaganda, and had an excellent sense of publicity timing while the Nationalists sometimes pursued a policy of studied reticence on the Communist controversy. The combination of high-geared Communist propaganda and a blundering government policy of censorship served as the main factor in the less favorable foreign press which, Chinese Nationalist government began to receive in 1940, and which grew into such a formidable press relations problem by 1945.[1]

The Chinese Communists had been comparatively quiet before they were certain that China could survive her struggle with Japan. When it became clear that China would be able to continue the war and that there was a possibility of the United States and Britain joining in, the tactics of the Communists immediately shifted. Leaders of Red armies began

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[1]Hollington K. Tong. China and the World Press (Nanking: 1948), n.p., p. 156.

to expand the areas of their influence. Their action inevitably caused frictions which were considered by the foreign correspondents as valuable stories to be reported. Suppression of such stories by Chinese government censors estranged the foreign correspondents, with the result that China came in for damaging criticism and attack in the press abroad.

After a clash between the government and Communist troops in Anhwei province ensured, which led to the capture of the commander and officers of the Communist New Fourth Army, the spokesmen of the Nationalist Government were reluctant to discuss it with foreign correspondents, and what they said was usually guarded and less convincing to foreign visitors than the apparently frank Communist version. This policy of silence was justified upon the ground that any airing of internal strife would "give aid and comfort to the Japanese enemy", and that it would make difficult the negotiations for an amicable settlement with the Communists. Some foreign newsmen, having first heard the Communist version, received subsequent government explanations with considerable skepticism. The opinion became general that is was the Nationalist Government, not the Communist Party, that staged the coup. The Chinese Communists have always had a better appreciation of the value and techniques of publicity than most Nationalist Government officials. When they foresaw

that peace talk was inevitable, they made certain in advance that foreign opinion was prepared to believe that Communist troops were the victims of ill-treatment and unfair discrimination. Some correspondents who personally held leftist views, accepted the Communist stories and gave them wide publicity, particularly in America. Almost no counter measures were taken by the Nationalist Government to prepare the public, either at home or abroad, for the coming publicity duel. Had the documented information already in the hands of Nationalists concerning the New Fourth Army plot been given out before the clash, the charge of insubordination by the Communists might have been clearly established before world opinion.

It was in 1941 that the Chinese Communists adopted the propaganda line that they were the real Chinese "Democrats". This line soon became the favorite theme of the inspired pro-Communists publicity abroad. To bolster the claim, the Communists set up a show place in Yenan for foreigners to visit. Most of the visitors were convinced that the Communists were instituting a liberal democratic way of life in this area after they visited a convincing routine of democratic exhibits.

On the other side, the Nationalist Government did not publicize their show places to the world until it became

too late for the whole West to buy the story of real work which Kuomintang claimed had been done by them to prepare China for democracy. To many Western reporters, the voice of the Nationalists which was finally heard seemed to be only a weak rebuttal of the Communists. Among the unfavorable reports and criticisms of the Nationalist Government made by Western journalists such as Edgar Snow, Jack Belden, and Anna Strong in the early 1940's, many were later found contradictory to the stories recorded in governmental or historical documents.

As the foreign correspondents in China expressed diverse opinions on Kuomintang-Communist dispute during the 1940's, most of the government and civilian leaders of world nations showed a favorable attitude towards the Kuomintang and its Central Government, until the time that the recognition issue arose after Chiang Kai-shek removed his capital to Taipei, city of North Taiwan.

The United States, the nation considered as the only super-power in the war time capable of preventing the loss of China, had been standing with the Nationalists, though having declining and deteriorating relations with them. Reports on Chinese war from the United States showed more coverage of the American government's attention to Kuomingtan than the Communist Party, as messages from battlefields in

China often spread pessimism over the Nationalists' resistance and strong interest in the incredible rising of Mao Tse-tung.

E. United States' Role in the War

Historians are still making attempts to draw definite assessment on the causes of the Nationalist defeat in 1949, though few of them have gained wide agreement to their study.

Among all the conceived causes of the fall of China, the failure of American mediation and aid and the Soviet's military support of Chinese Communists have been what the Nationalist Chinese contend most vital. Some American and Western historians however have labeled government corruption and the inflation and economic collapse as the key reasons. Other causes generally accepted by most foreign China experts include destruction of the military strength of Kuomintang government after the Sino-Japanese War, and its loss of public-confidence as well as respect.

Among the studies on China's contemporary history, many have focused on the delicate Sino-American relationship during the late stage of Chinese Civil War. President Truman, as holding a basically favorable stand toward the Nationalist Government, had either rejected or largely cut down most of the urgent aid request by both the Chinese Government and Asia-based American military figures such as General Claire

Chennault and General Douglas MacArthur. George Marshall, then special envoy of Truman to China, had miserably failed in his mission to mediate the Chinese war because of his naive notion that the Chinese Communists were merely agrarian reformers different from the Russian Communists--a general belief spread around the top circle of Washington. There was also the American cliche that the Nationalists were corrupt, dictatorial and feudal, whereas in fact they hardly enjoyed a day of peace to put into practice their program of democracy since their rise to power in 1928.

> ...Because of the failure of mediation and the complete disillusionment that followed, the U.S. gave the Nationalist Government only limited aid in 1947-48--too little and too late. In the last analysis, the Nationalists lost their gamble in assuming that U.S. could not afford to see them go down the drain.[2]

Twenty-eight years have passed. For most people in the world today Communism no longer implies the state of poverty and uprising, but more often a sense of power and revolution. Ever since the Nixon Administration, the United States, still acting as the leader of the democratic allies, has been seeking a situation where the "normalization of

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[2]Immanuel C.Y. Hsu. The Rise of Modern China. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 737.

Sino-American relationship" could be carried out. Despite the fact the reaction of the Chinese Communist leaders has been more indifferent, a complete diplomatic relationship between the two countries appears to be a matter of time. On the other side, the Nationalist Government--now largely referred to as the "Taiwan Government", and its 17-million people living in a free society with a blended culture of Chinese tradition and Western modernity, have been paid much less attention by their once strongly-backing ally, even though the Chinese Ambassador from Taipei still owns his big and splendid office in Washington.

As long as the cold war between the two Chinese governments continues and the China problem remains unsolved, historians will find it impossible to determine between a "+" and "-" for the year of 1949.

II. CONTENT ANALYSIS

A. Newspaper Selection

The "China War" is over, despite the continuation of its dramatic impact on many nations and a mass population of people. To conduct research on such a remote event, one would find no better technique than a content analysis of the activities recorded in the printed media. Today, few researchers would argue the fact that the newspaper is the most detailed and reliable source for any contemporary historical event that occurred before the revolution of television.

In the United States, newspapers have been the main public opinion shaper since colonial days. Along with the internationally political dominance of the nation they serve, American newspapers have been used to exert strong influence not only on foreign policy but also the internal affairs of other countries of the world. Only the leading western countries like Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, historically in close connection with the United States, are to a lesser extent affected by United States press reports. Foreign governments long tended to scrutinize the three United States internationally-circulated newspapers, The New

York Times, The New York Herald Tribune, and The Christian Science Monitor for possible clues to United States' policy or the reflection of American official and public attitude on their foreign policy. It had been more true during the Post-World War II years when more than half of the countries in the world received more or less American aid, military or economic or both.

Extensive reporting on Chinese affairs was relatively new in American newspapers, whose international coverage was mainly occupied with European affairs. The trend was first changed as the result of the Pacific war. Again, the year of 1949 served as a dividing point, that switched the concentration of United States news coverage from the Nationalist Government to the Communist regime.

Four newspapers were chosen for this study: (1) The New York Times, (2) The Christian Science Monitor, (3) The Chicago Tribune, and (4) The St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

The New York Times and The Christian Science Monitor as the top internationally-circulated United States newspapers, maintained their own analyses and interpretative reports on the Civil War in addition to news agency reports.

Good reputation in accurate and quality reporting of The Chicago Tribune and The St. Louis Post-Dispatch as leading regional papers provides strong reason for them to

be selected as part of the sample of this study. The former has widely been considered a national conservative and the latter a domestic liberal.

The Tribune and The Post-Dispatch subscribe to Associated Press, United Press International, and various other news services.

Many of the analytical reports to be found in this study were written by syndicated columinsts or American foreign correspondents. The bulk of printed stories came from news agencies, almost exclusively the Associated Press and United Press International. The merit of using more news services is still debatable, in the light of news consistency and operational cost. Allowing more diversified reports to appear, however, has its advantage for an increasingly sophisticated public. Limited to its assigned volume, this study of content analysis will be conducted upon the data collected only from newspaper coverage of a one-month period.

December of 1949 was the last month of that year as well as the legacy of Kuomintang regime on the mainland. There had been considerably more reports on Chinese Civil War by American newsmen in December 1949 than any other equally-long period during the wartime. However, like the selection of the United States newspapers to be investigated,

such a sample of time period for a study which partly intends to examine the attitudes of American newspapers toward the loss of China is bound to be unrepresentable, because of the high flexibility of the war situation and the frequent alternation of the journalists' attitudes toward the two Chinese parties.

Although some possible technical drawbacks may be found on sample selection, this study will eventually achieve its major objective by illustrating and analyzing the American newspapers' coverage on the Chinese Civil War through a simplified method of content analysis.

There will be five sub-studies to be conducted in this analysis of newspaper content, namely (1) attention, (2) classification, (3) themes, (4) favorable vs. unfavorable, and (5) rating.

B. Comparative Attention of Selected Newspapers

The eight-year-long Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), which became in the later stage, the Pacific part of World War II considerably increased the United States newspaper space devoted to Chinese affairs in the following years. In this study, interpretative analyses as independent strides or supplementary background material were abundant in quantity among all newspapers surveyed.

Each article was classified as relating to either Nationalist China or Communist China by comparing the quantity of its reference. Few of the articles under study contained statements of equal reference to both, thus problems of ambiguous classification were avoided.

The classification was made of the number of items and the amount of space in column inches[3] attributed to either Nationalist or Communist China. However, under the same headline, individual sub-items dealing with matters of different nature, were considered as separate articles. Table I indicates the comparison of general attention in terms of items and space paid by each selected newspaper regarding the two Chinese parties during the designated period.

Among all the articles a couple of them concerning American foreign policy in which the China problem was mentioned, were counted in item, but only the China-related portion of the articles were measured as occupied space.

An editorial of The St. Louis Post-Dispatch published on December 31, which dealt mainly with Chinese affairs was

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[3]Bernard Berelsen. Content Analysis in Communication Research (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1952), p. 141.

TABLE I

Comparative Attention in Terms of Item and Space Regarding Both Chinese Published in Selected Newspapers During A One-month Period (Dec., 1949)

Newspaper		KMT No./inch	KMT %	CCP No./inch	CCP %	Total No./inch	Total %
N.Y. Times	item	110	58	81	42	191	100
	space	989.30	56	773.55	44	1762.85	100
Christian Science Monitor	item	35	47	40	53	75	100
	space	402.60	47	461.55	53	864.15	100
Chicago Daily Tribune	item	42	50	42	50	84	100
	space	304.80	56	241.70	44	546.50	100
St. Louis Post-Dispatch	item	37	56	29	44	66	100
	space	442.89	51	427.64	49	870.53	100
Total	item	224	54	192	46	416	100
	space	2139.59	53	1904.44	47	4044.03	100

taken into account despite its generalized title as "Light and Darkness in Asia".[4] Each of the numerous photos, maps and cartoons were treated the same way as articles of words.

Among the selected newspapers, The Christian Science Monitor was the only one that paid more attention to the Communists than the Nationalists, while the other three contributed their majority space to the Kuomintang government and followers during the last month of 1949.

The New York Times and The Chicago Tribune proportionately showed the same attitude toward the two Chinese powers over this period by each giving 56% of total coverage of China to the Nationalists and 46% to the Communists. The slightest margin was found in The St. Louis Post-Dispatch where the ratio appeared as 51% to 49%.

There were 4044.03 column-inches of space in total occupied by China affairs, of which 53% was devoted to the Nationalists and 47% to the Communists. Itemwise, The Chicago Tribune equally contributed to the Nationalists and Communists by containing 42 articles regarding each of them. The Christian Science Monitor again was the only one that handled more events of Communists than those of Nationalists.

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[4]The St. Louis Post Dispatch. Dec. 31, 1949 p. 4A, Col. 3.

A total of 416 China-related articles were published in the whole month by these newspapers of which, Nationalists scored 54% (224 items), and Communists 46% (192 items).

The slight margins found by comparing the percentages indicated the increased attention received by the Chinese Communists who, only a few years ago were much less attractive to the American press.

During the period examined, The New York Times, as America's leading international newspaper, published far more news about Chinese affairs than any other selected newspaper. It's also noteworthy that, The Times showed a fairly strong interest in the declining Kuomintang.

C. Classification of Newspaper Coverage

Each article in this study was also classified as news report, interpretative analysis, editorial (including "letter to the editor"), text, cartoon, illustration (photo, map, etc.).

Difficulties in distinguishing interpretative analyses from news reports were often encountered, though there is a well-established line between the two. A news report is defined in this study as "a timely report of facts of either interest or importance, or both, to a considerable number of people". A margin is usually allowed for background material

or explanatory supplement printed in support of the news reports. Interpretative analyses here embraces two forms of interpretations: editorial interpretation and factual interpretation. The former has the opinion of some individual foisted upon one instead of receiving facts, as accurate, impartial and clearly defined as it is possible to make them. The latter is defined as "no opinion is expressed by the writer directly or indirectly, but the event is put in its proper perspective, and the background, together with its possible meaning, is sketched in with clinical objectivity.

Among the 416 articles examined, more than one-half were in the form of combination of news and analysis. The distinction made in this study, depends upon the proportion of these two elements. An article that contains more news than analysis, was classified as news report, and vice versa.

Items labeled as editorial in this study consisted of standard editorial columns on the editorial page written by the newspapers staff and the letters to the editor from the readers selected by the editor.

By examining Table II and III, some findings were obtained follows:

1) News reports as the main items published, scored 66¢ in space (2698.50 out of 4044.03 inches) with (40% for KMT, 26% for CCP), and 76% in number (319 out of 416 items) with 43%

TABLE II

Items and Space by Classification Regarding Chinese Nationalists Published in Selected Newspapers During a One-month Period (Dec. 1949).

Newspaper		News	Anal.	Edit.	Text	Ill.	Cart.	Total
New York Times	item	89	6	4	2	9	0	110
	space	761.45	121.60	30.20	27.25	48.80	0	989.30
Christian Science Monitor	item	30	2	1	0	2	0	35
	space	318.50	45.50	13.80	0	24.80	0	402.60
Chicago Tribune	item	34	4	0	0	4	0	42
	space	239.75	35.7	0	0	29.35	0	304.80
St. Louis Post-Dispatch	item	29	4	1	0	3	0	37
	space	327.96	84.42	7.65	0	22.86	0	442.89
Total	item	182	16	6	2	18	0	224
	space	1647.66	287.22	51.65	27.25	125.81	0	2139.59
Percent of general totals	item	43	4	2	1	4	0	54
	space	40	7	2	1	3	0	53

TABLE III

Items and Space by Classification Regarding Chinese Communists Published in Selected Newspapers During a One-month Period (Dec. 1949).

Newspaper		News	Anal.	Edit.	Text	Ill.	Cart.	Total
New York Times	item	56	9	10	0	4	2	81
	space	414.80	166.70	129.65	0	45.40	17.00	773.55
Christian Science Monitor	item	31	4	2	0	1	2	40
	space	269.65	101.25	40.60	0	17.25	32.80	461.55
Chicago Tribune	item	31	3	3	0	5	0	42
	space	153.45	45.30	23.00	0	19.95	0	241.70
St. Louis Post-Dispatch	item	19	5	1	0	2	2	29
	space	212.94	114.16	8.78	0	37.08	54.68	427.64
Total	item	137	21	16	0	12	6	192
	space	1050.84	427.41	202.03	0	119.68	104.48	1904.44
Percent of general totals	item	33	5	4	0	3	1	46
	space	26	10	5	0	3	3	47

Abbreviations: "News" stands for news reports; "Anal." for interpretative analysis; "Edit" for editorials; "Text" for statements of text; "Ill." for illustrations; "Cart." for cartoons. "Item" designates the number of articles and "Space", the number of column inches.

for KMT, 33% for CCP. Most of the news reports were from Associated Press, United Press, and foreign correspondents of The New York Times and The Christian Science Monitor.

2) Next to the news report, interpretative analysis ranked the second in volume. Among all articles covering Communist affairs, 11% were printed as interpretative analysis in item and 22% in space. In contrast, the interpretative analysis only about the Nationalists scored only 7% in terms of item, and 13% by size. To view the situation from another angle, 21 interpretative analyses and 427.41 column inches were on the Communist as against 11 items and 287.22 inches on the Nationalists. General unfamiliarity of the American public with the Chinese Communists possibly served as a strong factor to the journalists' motivation to publish more interpretative statements about the Chinese "agrarian reformers".

3) In editorials, Chinese affairs registered 22 articles in 253.68 inches of which, a four-fifth majority went to Communists.

4) Texts were scarce. Both of the only two texts--United States' protest to Nationalists' blockade of Shanghai and U.N. resolutions on China--appeared in The New York Times.

5) Illustrations, either independent or subordinate to the feature reports, were abundant for both Nationalists and Communists. Editorial cartoons only focused on the Chinese

Reds. There were six items or 104.48 column inches devoted to political cartoons on the Communists.

6) The New York Times as the leading scorer, published 145 items of news reports--89 for Kuomintang and 56 for its rival. Of the total 22 editorials on China printed by the selected newspapers, The Times alone contained 14 items, of which ten at this time were on the Communists with 129.65 inches in space.

7) In summary, Nationalists outweighed Communists in the categories of news, text, and illustration, while Communists, on the other hand, were ahead of Nationalists under the classifications of analysis, editorials, and cartoons.

D. Classification of Themes

The principal purpose of this section which, deals with the themes of newspaper coverage is to evaluate what field of Chinese affairs on the final stage of Civil War primarily interested the American press for public consumption.

Things of political, military or a economical nature happened every day in China during the war. The determination of the coverage and selection of the news by the reporter and editor partly reflect their attitude and chief area of attention toward the Chinese war. Each of the topics on

both Nationalist and Communist affairs was categorized into one of the five areas: 1) military action, 2) politics, 3) economy, 4) foreign relations and 5) civilian affairs.

Many articles with a mixed content made it hard to decide how to assign them to the proper categories. The criterion again lays on the nature of the major elements or implication of the article examined. For example, the removal of Kuomintang's capital from Chengtu to Taipei, though as a result of military defeat, which, in each newspaper's coverage, appeared more a political event than military action, was treated as an item relating to "politics". An Associated Press dispatch in The Chicago Tribune, "British in Red China to sell coal to Japan"[5] which could be labeled as an economical or civilian affair, was actually placed under foreign relations because of its strong suggestion to the unchanged relations between the foreigners and the new rulers of China.

Articles included in this study are not necessarily directly related to the Civil War but also those concerning Chinese affairs published by the selected newspapers during the period under study. Thus, a number of articles within which either the Chinese government or its people was given

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[5]The Chicago Tribune. Dec. 30, 1949, p. 1-2, Col. 8.

TABLE IV

Themes Classification of Items Regarding Chinese Nationalists Published in the Selected Newspapers During a One-month Period (Dec. 1949).

Newspaper		Military Action		Politics		Economy		Foreign Relations		Civilian Affairs		Total	
		No/inch	%	No/inch	%	No/inch	%	No/inch	%	No/inch	%	No/inch	%
New York Times	item	21	19	23	21	0	0	66	60	0	0	110	100
	space	23.65	21	173.55	17	0	0	612.10	62	0	0	989.30	100
Christian Science Monitor	item	6	18	10	29	0	0	18	50	1	3	35	100
	space	68.65	17	68.45	17	0	0	245.00	61	20.5	5	402.60	100
Chicago Tribune	item	7	17	7	17	0	0	26	62	2	4	42	100
	space	32.25	10	42.95	14	0	0	215.80	71	13.8	5	304.80	100
St. Louis Post-Dispatch	item	9	24	5	14	1	3	20	54	2	5	37	100
	space	102.83	23	39.78	9	39.42	9	231.52	34	29.34	7	442.89	100
Total	item	43	19	45	20	1	1	130	58	5	2	224	100
	space	407.38	19	324.73	15	39.42	2	1304.42	61	63.64	3	439.59	100

TABLE V

Themes Classification of Items on Chinese Affairs Published in Selected Newspapers During a One-month Period (Dec. 1949).

Newspaper		Military Action		Politics		Economy		Foreign Relations		Civilian Affairs		Total	
		No/inch	%	No/inch	%	No/inch	%	No/inch	%	No/inch	%	No/inch	%
New York Times	item	7	9	6	8	7	9	59	73	2	3	81	100
	space	63.60	8	71.75	9	96.30	12	522.20	68	19.70	3	773.55	100
Christian Science Monitor	item	3	7	3	7	4	10	30	73	1	3	40	100
	space	9.40	2	48.85	10	70.05	15	316.00	69	17.25	4	461.55	100
Chicago Tribune	item	5	12	1	2	0	0	35	84	1	2	42	100
	space	28.70	12	3.00	1	0	0	195.50	81	14.50	6	241.70	100
St. Louis Post-Dispatch	item	2	7	3	10	0	0	22	76	29	7	29	100
	space	33.30	8	47.25	11	0	0	291.11	68	56.25	13	427.64	100
Total	item	17	9	13	7	11	5	146	76	6	3	192	100
	space	134.73	7	170.85	9	166.35	9	1324.81	70	107.70	5	1904.44	100

attention, have been included in this survey even though their headlines did not indicate a China story. Examples are: News reports about United States senators proposal for a bipartisan policy and editorials regarding the Asian situation or United States foreign policy, etc.

Since the Nationalists' shelling of United States ships running the Shanghai blockade and the mistreatment of American consul Angus Ward by the Reds were the two incidents that aroused strong protests from United States government and civilian groups, news and editorials regarding the so-called "violations of U.S. rights" by the two Chinese regimes were found here and there in the newspapers surveyed. Issues such as recognition of Red China, and United States policy on Formosa were fairly popular too. Item and space under foreign relations thus dominated other topics on both Nationalists and Communists for all newspapers studied.

In total, 130 articles 58% of all items on Nationalists), 1304.42 inches (61% of total space on Nationalists) were devoted to foreign relations. The dominance was even greater in the Communist part--146 articles (76%) and 1324.81 inches (70%).

Military action of the Nationalists received the second great attention in terms of space (407.38) inches). Politics scored 45 items with 324.73 inches. Civilian affairs

were given 63.64 inches for five items, as economy, 39.42 inches for one item.

On the other hand, Communists' military action scored more items (17 articles vs. 13 articles) but less space (134.73 inches vs. 170.85 inches).

A considerable amount of attention was paid to the economy in the areas under the Red regime partly because of the observable economic crisis resulted from the social instability, the poor technology and the Shanghai blockade.

The New York Times designated 60% of its Kuomintang articles (66 items) to the category of foreign relations, 21% (23 items) to military action. It reported nothing about economical and civilian activities of the Nationalist government. Major concern of The Times with the Communists affairs laid on the foreign relations subjects (59 items, 522.20 inches). The economy, which scored zero in the KMT record, was granted seven items and 96.30 inches.

The Christian Science Monitor contained 30 foreign-relation items with 316.00 inches for Communists and 18 items with 245.00 inches for Nationalists, while it lended four items of 70.05 inches to the economy of the Communists and nothing to that of the Nationalists.

The major interest of The Chicago Tribune on Chinese

affairs in the period under study was apparently placed on the foreign relations of both Chinese parties. The Tribune contributed 35 of its 42 total articles on Communists, and 195.50 inches (81% of total space) to cover the foreign-relation related events.

As well as the other three papers, The St. Louis Post-Dispatch emphasized in foreign relations for both Chinas, but reported more military action and political development of the Nationalists than of the Communists. It recorded nine stories about Nationalists' military action, five items for KMT politics while five and one articles were published for the Communists in military and political affairs respectively.

The tables suggest that in late 1949, American newspapers' coverage was primarily focused on the relationship between China and other countries. Meanwhile, the American press was less interested in Nationalist China's economic and civilian affairs than its military and political developments. The Communists, however, received a more balanced attention almost equally covering all respects apart from foreign relations.

E. Evaluation: Favorable vs. Unfavorable

In order to determine the general opinion and attitude of American newspapers on the China dispute in a time period that the loss of mainland China to the Communists took place, an evaluative content analysis was designed as an attempt to achieve the purpose. All the articles were classified into five categories, namely: "very favorable", "favorable", "neutral", "unfavorable" and "very unfavorable". The categorization of "favorable" vs "unfavorable", which is merely a judgement of value, is also called "direction" or "orientation". To determine whether the message was for or against the particular subject or neutral toward it, the investigator must make a judgement by applying a qualitative or quantitative basis.

Ole R. Holsti stated in his book that "the content analyst should use qualitative and quantitative methods to supplement each other. It is by moving back and forth between these approaches that the investigator is most likely to gain insight into the meaning of his data."[6] Thus, the author

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[6]Ole R. Holsti. Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Philippines: Addison-Wesley Company, 1969), p. 11.

of this study has decided to apply the quality and quantity combined method as the approach of measurements and determination. That is to say, the implication of a term was of equal significance to the frequency of it in a given article. If an article contained more or stronger favorable elements than the unfavorable, it was categorized as "very favorable" or "favorable" depending on the extent to which it showed its attitude. If in an article, both elements were approximately balanced, even though with strong positive or negative attitude, it would be termed as "neutral".

Not until both the title and content of an article were weighted, could the attitude be certain. However, the title was often of greater significance than the content. One example is an article in The New York Times which reads in title "U.S. will review policy if Chiang loses mainland". Although this report was mainly confirming America's unwillingness to recognize Communist China as long as the Nationalists' resistance on the mainland went on, it was labeled "Neutral" because of the offset made by the opposite title.

In order to present a more precise comparison on the positive or negative mood of newspaper content toward either Chinese regime, each "very favorable" item was given a weight of +2, "favorable" +1, "neutral" 0, "unfavorable" -1, and "very favorable" -2. The ratios of "plusness" and "minusness"

were calculated so as to determine each newspaper's standing on the China problem during the last month of the war time.

Table VI to X were designed to indicate:

1) the comparison of favorable and unfavorable ratings of the two Chinas,

2) the ratings of items and space regarding Nationalists,

3) the ratings of items and space regarding Communists,

4) the ratio of favorable and unfavorable item ratings in four newspapers, and

5) the ratio of favorable and unfavorable item-ratings in each newspaper

Table VI showed the comparison of favorable and unfavorable coverage between the Nationalists and Communists. On the basis of item, Kuomintang had three articles (1%) "very favorable" against CCP's zero; 55 (25%) "favorable" against 54 (28%); 68 (30%) "neutral" against 55 (29%); 91 (41%) "unfavorable" against 61 (32%); and seven "very unfavorable" (3%) against 22 (11%).

In terms of space, Nationalists had 22.80 inches (1%) for the category of "very favorable" 587.92 (28%) for "favorable", 575.90 (27%) for "neutral", 844.32 (39%) for "unfavorable" and 108.65 (5%) for "very unfavorable", as Communists had naught for "very favorable", 516.53 (27%)

TABLE VI

Comparison of Favorable and Unfavorable Ratings of Item/Space Regarding Both Chinese in Selected Newspapers During a One-month Period (Dec. 1949).

Ratings		KMT		CCP	
		No/inch	%	No/inch	%
Very Favorable	item	3	1	0	0
	space	22.80	1	0	0
Favorable	item	55	25	54	28
	space	587.92	28	516.21	27
Neutral	item	68	30	55	29
	space	575.90	27	516.21	27
Unfavorable	item	91	41	61	32
	space	844.32	39	621.27	33
Very Unfavorable	item	7	3	22	11
	space	108.65	5	250.43	13
Total	item	224	100	192	100
	space	2139.59	100	1904.44	100

TABLE VII

Favorable and Unfavorable Ratings of Items/Space Regarding Chinese Nationalists in each Selected Newspaper During a One-month Period (Dec. 1949).

Ratings		New York Times		Christian Science Monitor		Chicago Tribune		St. Louis Post Dispatch		Total	
		No/inch	%	No/inch	%	No/inch	%	No/inch	%	No/inch	%
Very Favorable	item	2	2	0	0	1	3	0	0	3	1
	space	18.10	2	0	0	4.70	2	0	0	22.80	1
Favorable	item	31	28	5	14	10	24	9	24	55	25
	space	272.80	28	68.75	17	91.8	30	154.57	35	587.92	28
Neutral	item	36	33	12	34	10	24	10	27	68	30
	space	268.60	27	166.30	41	54.1	18	86.90	20	575.90	27
Unfavorable	item	37	33	18	52	21	50	15	41	91	41
	space	363.90	37	167.55	42	154.20	50	158.67	36	844.32	39
Very Favorable	item	4	4	0	0	0	0	3	8	7	3
	space	65.9	6	0	0	0	0	42.75	9	108.65	5
Total	item	110	100	35	100	42	100	37	100	224	100

TABLE VIII

Favorable and Unfavorable Ratings of Item/Space Regarding Chinese Communists in Selected Newspapers During a One-month Period (Dec. 1949).

Ratings		New York Times		Christian Science Monitor		Chicago Tribune		St. Louis Post Dispatch		Total	
		No/inch	%	No/inch	%	No/inch	%	No/inch	%	No/inch	%
Very Favorable	item	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	space	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Favorable	item	24	30	14	35	9	21	7	24	54	28
	space	244.00	32	134.20	29	46.40	19	91.93	22	516.53	27
Neutral	item	24	30	8	20	10	24	13	45	55	29
	space	171.85	22	107.35	23	31.90	13	205.11	48	516.21	27
Unfavorable	item	823	28	15	37	16	38	7	24	61	32
	space	249.00	32	198.30	43	91.30	38	82.67	19	621.27	33
Very Unfavorable	item	10	12	3	8	7	17	2	7	22	11
	space	108.70	14	21.7	5	72.10	30	47.93	11	250.43	13
Total	item	81	100	40	100	42	100	29	100	192	100
	space	773.55	100	461.55	100	241.70	100	427.64	100	1904.44	100

TABLE IX

Ratios of Favorable and Unfavorable Item-ratings Regarding Both Chinese in Selected Newspapers During a One-month Period (Dec. 1949).

Ratings	Weights	KMT		CCP	
		No.	Point	No.	Point
Very Favorable	+2	3	+6	0	0
Favorable	+1	55	+55	54	+54
Neutral	0	68	0	55	0
Unfavorable	-1	91	-91	61	-61
Very Unfavorable	-2	7	-14	22	-44
Total		224	-44	192	-51
Ratios			-0.20		-0.27

TABLE X

Ratios of Favorable and Unfavorable Item/Ratings Regarding Both Chinese in Each Selected Newspaper During a One-month Period (Dec. 1949).

Newspaper	KMT			CCP		
	Item	Point	Ratio	Item	Point	Ratio
New York Times	110	-10	-0.09	81	-19	-0.23
Christian Science Monitor	35	-13	-0.37	40	-7	-0.18
Chicago Tribune	42	-9	-0.21	42	-21	-0.51
St. Louis Post-Dispatch	37	-12	-0.32	29	-4	-0.14
Total	224	-44	-0.20	192	-51	-0.27

for "favorable", 516.21 (27%) for "neutral", 621.27 (33%) for "unfavorable" and 250.43 (13%) for "very unfavorable".

In general, the American newspapers more often showed a "neutral" attitude toward the Nationalists than the Communists. Meanwhile they gave more "unfavorable" but less "very unfavorable" responses to Nationalist than Communist China.

Attitudes of individual newspapers toward the Civil War of China were indicated in Table VII, VIII, and X. The New York Times published 110 articles on the Nationalist side of which, over 90% were labeled "favorable", "neutral" or "unfavorable". It published only two "very favorable" articles: one, a news report carrying an interview with Chiang Kai-shek, the other an editorial, concerning an American-educated new governor of Formosa. Among those four "very unfavorable" articles of The Times, three were related to United States protest to Nationalists' Shanghai blockade.

The Times printed 81 articles for the Communist affairs of which none was considered "very favorable", yet, ten were "very unfavorable". Most of the "favorable" stories were connected with military advance of the Red army and foreign recognition of the new Communist regime. As for the "unfavorable" articles, which included most of the editorials, the Chinese Reds received varying criticisms

from news reports such as "Ward paid Chinese Reds 7,000 for 400-mile, third-class train ride"[7] to "Chinese Reds face crisis in finances".[8]

The Christian Science Monitor gave the Nationalist Chinese neither "very favorable" or "very unfavorable". Its 18 "unfavorable" articles concentrated on the case of Mukden consul Angus Ward, which, being categorized as an event of "foreign relations", attracted a considerable amount of attention of American press.

There were three "very unfavorable" stories relating to the Reds seen on The Monitor. However, it published more "favorable" and less "unfavorable" articles on Communists than Nationalists.

The Chicago Tribune presented a relatively similar picture as the two alone-mentioned newspapers. The extreme majority of its publications on Chinese war were spread over the categories of "favorable", "neutral" and "unfavorable". Yet, it registered one "very favorable" article for Nationalists as well as Communists. Moreover, it gave no "very unfavorable" coverage on KMT, but seven on CCP. It was

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[7] The New York Times, Dec. 13, 1949, p. 23 Col. 3.

[8] The New York Times, Dec. 6, 1949, p. 20, col. 2.

The Tribune that paid the most attention and strongest response to the case of Ward and other American personnel held by the Chinese Communists. The fact that the wife of Elmer C. Bender, one of the Yanks held on the mainland, was a Chicagoan had possibly contributed to The Tribune's emphasis on the issue.

Among the 37 articles regarding Nationalist China published by The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, nine of them were classified "favorable"; ten "neutral"; 15 "unfavorable"; and three "very unfavorable". Most of the criticisms went to Kuomintang's military setback and its Shanghai blockade. The Post-Dispatch, as well as The Christian Science Monitor, registered zero for articles on Chinese Nationalists.

The Communist regime scored only 29 articles with 427.64 inches as total space, which consisted of 7 "unfavorable", 2 "very unfavorable", 13 "neutral", 7 "favorable" articles. Of all the negative stories, five focused on the Communist-held Americans. The Post-Dispatch, next only to The New York Times, carried 13 "neutral" articles of which three Associated Press dispatches and one interpretative analysis dealt with the relations between the Communist China and Russia. One of the two "very unfavorable" articles told of the event of Mukden Consul Angus Ward who charged that Chinese

Reds "gave him hellish treatment in jail";[9] the other one titled "Chinese Reds race to tighten grip before opposition grows"[10] interpreted internal problems of Red China.

Figures provided by Table IX and X were of significant value. The Kuomintang gained -44 points out of its 224 articles as Communist China scored -51 from 192 stories.

The New York Times gave Nationalist China -10 points against Communist China's -19 points; The Christian Science Monitor: -13 vs -7; The Chicago Tribune: -9 vs -21; The St. Louis Post-Dispatch: -12 vs -4.

The KMT, taking advantage of its three "very favorable" articles, outweighed the CCP by 7 points in total. An interesting coincedence was that the two Chinese regimes gained exactly the same score for all articles of "unfavorable" and "very unfavorable" nature combined (-105), despite the fact that much more "very unfavorable" stories were printed regarding the Communist Chinese.

By observing the ratios of each newspaper, The New York Times, scoring -0.09 for KMT and -0.23 for CCP showed generally a slightly unfavorable attitude toward the former, but more negative about the latter; The Christian Science

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[9]The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 12, 1949, p. 1A, Col. 2

[10]The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 16, 1949, p. 1E, Col. 4.

Monitor, together with The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, on the contrary, indicated their more "unfavorable" response to Nationalist than Communist China; The Chicago Tribune, publishing the most criticisms on Chinese war among the four newspapers appeared to be fairly unfavorable to the Nationalists, but gave much worse tone to the Communists.

As a whole, the Kuomintang scored -0.20 as its general ratio which, slightly edged the Communists' -0.27.

III. CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS

It seems to be a common agreement of all American newsmen that Oriental affairs are the most difficult for them to handle. Only a decade after the end of the Chinese Civil War, Stanley Karnow, Time correspondent in Hong Kong, made this statement with a deep sigh:

> ...Few reporting jobs in the world, I believe, are more important, and not many are as fascinating (than the China correspondent). Yet, none that I know can be so chronically frustrating....the Hong Kong operatives must be studious without being academic, patient without being docile, imaginative yet not dreamy. Above all, he must be skeptical and humble....He is forced to observe by intermediary like an art critic attempting to judge paintings from second hand description....There seemed no likelihood of visas (to mainland China) delivered (to American journalists) in the forseeable future, but...here I am, making the mistake of predicting what Peking might do, when experience should have taught me that only Peking's unpredictability is predictable.[11]

Likewise, China correspondents from the Western press during the Civil War period had suffered from great communicative misunderstanding and the unavailability of valuable

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[11] Louis M. Lyons, ed., Reporting the News. (Cambridge, Massachussetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 323.

news as well. The final findings of this study thus would not necessarily reflect the exact interests of the American newsmen in China who might send out any news available no matter if it was the one that he most wanted. Just like what Henry Shapiro criticized "The American press has a common temptation to rush into print with inadequately considered comment and speculation on Communist events",[12] there was inevitably inaccuracy or misinterpretation on the reporting of the Communists' incredible victory in China's war because of their unexplanatory behavior and the propaganda statements made by the Red officials. Of course, the Nationalist Government, on the other hand, made an almost equal effort in propaganda which as well led the American journalists to a misty corner where real facts could not be reflected.

Concluded from this study, the American newspapers tended to pay a little more attention to National ist China than to its rival in the Civil War. However, on the average, articles on Chinese Communists appeared more lengthy and thorough than those on the Nationalists. In the mean time, analytical reporting appeared in nearly one quarter of total Communist articles. Yet straight news reporting on Chinese affairs still dominated other items in American newspapers.

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[12]Lyons, p. 314.

Articles containing critical elements were abundant simply because of the nationwide attention in the United States stimulated by the Nationalists' Shanghai blockade and Communists' mistreatment of American Consul Angus Ward. News coverage of the Chinese war occupied relatively conspicuous places. The cause of foreign relations of both Chinas turned out to be most attractive to the American press. Reports on military and political developments were also frequently found, with their item and space next to that of foreign relations only.

Several findings regarding American newspapers' attitude toward Chinese Civil War revealed by this study are as follows:

1) News reports remained the chief items. Interpretative analyses were frequently found particularly in the reporting of Communist affairs.

2) As far as the political and military situations were concerned, a pessimistic atmosphere for the declining Kuomintang regime spread over American newspapers.

3) In reporting Chinese affairs, difficulties to collect direct, essential and accurate news were experienced.

4) The attitude of the United States Government toward the China problem upon the fall of the mainland was a major concern of the press.

5) The New York Times, with its most detailed coverage of China War, as well as The Chicago Tribune showed stronger disapproval of the Communists than the Nationalists. The other two newspapers, however, The Christian Science Monitor and The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, expressed less sympathy with the Nationalists than the Communists.

6. In general, American newspapers disagreed with either of the two powers of China that joined the dispute.

Today, twenty-eight years after the China split, Communist China receives much more of United States' newspapers' attention than Nationalist China in Taiwan, and has gained increasing favorable reports in the American press. It, however, does not necessarily imply a better Maoism-based Communist regime than the system of the Nationalist Government mainly based on Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of People.

The revolution and progress of the mass media in the twentieth century has greatly contributed to China's development and modernity. Efforts of foreign newsmen in helping people of the Western World understand China had also helped break the isolation of this old nation with other countries. Yet, there has been a common feeling of newspaper readers today that honest and objective reporting on the foreign issues becomes less and less.

Mencius, the philosopher and statesman in ancient China, warned twenty-four centuries ago: "The water that holds the boat at one time, may turn it over at another time."

An irresponsible journalist and his inaccurate or dishonest reporting may result in highly hazardous effects on the readers. It is a universal hope of all people today that a true understanding among all human beings which, is the fundamental structure of improvement in any relations, will be enhanced through the function of mass media and the people of this great profession who carry the unique responsibility in building a real peace for the future of the whole world.

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